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COMMENT
DISCRETION IN FELONY SENTENCING-
A STUDY OF INFLUENCING FACTORS
Criminal sentencing is a unique legal process in that it combines the
heaviest sanctions available to the legal system with the fewest proce-
dural protections for persons subjected to these sanctions. This com-
ment examines the need for empirical study of sentencing and reveals
the inadequacy of earlier studies. The primary thrust of the comment,
however, is a detailed analysis of the method and data of a recent
study1 conducted by the Washington State Superior Court Judges'
Association (W.S.S.C.J.A.). The analysis of the study begins to an-
swer important questions about sentencing by isolating the significant
factors used in judicial sentencing decisions and demonstrating the
relative importance of these factors. The data from the study chal-
lenge the constitutionality and public policy underlying discretionary
sentencing and indicate that discretionary sentencing embodies syste-
matic racial and social biases in no way dependent upon the culpabil-
ity of the offender, his background, or the circumstances of the crime.
I. THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL DATA
Sentencing is the end result of every criminal conviction. Although
the lengthy and tedious trial process is devoted to fairness in ascribing
guilt, most judges have virtually unfettered discretion to sentence the
defendant at the conclusion of that process. 2 Ordinarily, the judiciary
is free of any statutory constraints or appellate review in sentencing.
1. WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES' ASS'N, FACTORS AFFECTING JU-,
DICIAL DISCRETION IN FELONY SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL
ATTITUDES (1971) [hereinafter cited as W.S.S.C.J.A. STUDY]. The study was made
possible through a federal grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
of the United States Department of Justice, authorized under Title I, Pub. L. No.
90-35 1. The official report received limited distribution within the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, the Washington State Planning and Community Affairs
Agency, and the Washington State Superior Court Judges' Association. The basic raw
data and copies of the official report are in the University of Washington School of
Law Library.
2. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1, 29 (1972).
Judge Frankel eloquently describes the typical jurisdiction's sentencing posture:
The common form of criminal penalty provision confers upon the sentencing
judge an enormous range of choice. The scope of what we call "discretion" permits
857
Washington Law Review Vol. 48: 857, 1973
Present sentencing systems fall into two classes: the Model Penal
Code format and the totally or partially indeterminate sentence
format. The Model Penal Code is a recent reform enacted by many
states as part of an overall revision of their criminal codes.3 It sub-
stantially reclassifies offenses4 and, as adopted by many states, estab-
lishes criteria to be considered by the court in determining a sentence.5
Totally or partially indeterminate sentencing schemes6 generally
allow the judge to set only the maximum sentence (and sometimes the
minimum), permitting the length of the offender's actual sentence to
be later determined by statute, by the sentencing court, or by the pa-
role authorities or some similar agency.
The fundamental role of the criminal law is to create the "good so-
ciety" by defining man's minimum responsibility to his fellows and by
holding him to that responsibility. Its greatest value lies not in the
correction of offenders, but in the stimulus it provides to the great
imprisonment for anything from a day to one, five, 10, 20, or more years. All
would presumably join in denouncing a statute that said "the judge may impose
any sentence he pleases." Given the mortality of men, the power to set a man free
or confine him for up to 30 years is not sharply distinguishable.
The statutes granting such powers characteristically say nothing about the factors
to be weighed in moving to either end of the spectrum or to some place between.
Id. at 4.
3. As of April 1971, eleven states had revised their codes along the lines of the
Model Penal Code. Fourteen had completed revisions but had not yet enacted them. and
eighteen were planning revisions. Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws
Before a Subcomnin. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.. pt. 2. at
558-59 (1971).
4. Although the proposed Revised Washington Criminal Code does not follow the
Model Penal Code format, it does reduce the nineteen categories of criminal sentences
which exist under the current Washington Criminal Code to three major categories of no
more than three gradations. A Hornbook to the Code, 48 WASH. L. REV. 149, 149-50
(1972).
5. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1967). The proposed Washing-
ton Code does not include similar provisions because the judge does not have discretion
to determine the length of incarceration. This authority resides in the Board of Prison
Terms and Parole. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.95.010, .040 (1959). See note 20 infra.
6. Judge Frankel provides a useful working definition of "indeterminate sen-
tencing":
[The] term ["indeterminate sentence"] is widely used. But it has a somewhat inde-
terminate meaning. As I use it . . . it refers generally to any sentence of confine-
ment in which the actual term to be served is not known on the day ofjudgment but
will be subject, within a substantial range, to the later decision of a board of parole
or some comparable agency. In this sense there are varying degrees of indetermi-
nacy, ranging from places like California, where the Adult Authority is empowered
to set a maximum term of anywhere from a year to life, to, say, our federal system
where, as a general matter, the Board of Parole has discretion to grant parole at
any point between completion of one-third and two-thirds of the stated sentence.
Frankel, supra note 2, at 29.
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bulk of mankind to take pride in abiding by the law.7 However, the
criminal law undeniably goes beyond condemnation of criminal con-
duct and punishment of wilful transgressions. Concepts like correc-
tion, rehabilitation and treatment reflect the assumption that society
has a right, even a duty, to tailor an individual sentence for each of-
fender in a way that will prevent him from committing future crimes.8
This assumed need to individualize the sentencing process is the pri-
mary justification for giving judges unfettered discretion to sentence as
they please.9 However, in the absence of any tested and proven scien-
tific sentencing theories, the process of sentencing an offender without
external standards remains an intuitive decision 0 subject to the sen-
7. Hart, The Ahns of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 410
(1958).
8. The underlying rationale of . . . treatment [in criminal sentencing]. . . is
deceptively simple. It rejects inherited concepts of criminal punishment as the
payment of a debt owed to society, a debt proportioned to the magnitude of the
offender's wrong. Instead it would save the offender through constructive measures
of reformation, protect society by keeping the offender locked up until that refor-
mation is accomplished, and reduce the crime rate not only by using cure-
or-detention to eliminate recidivism, but hopefully also by the identification
of potential criminals in advance so that they can be rendered harmless by preven-
tive treatment. Thus the dispassionate behavioral expert displaces judge and theolo-
gian. The particular criminal act becomes irrelevant except insofar as it has diag-
nostic significance in classifying and treating the actor's particular criminal ty-
pology. Carried to an extreme, the sentence for all crimes would be the same: an
indeterminate commitment to imprisonment, probation, or parole, whichever was
dictated at any particular time by the treatment program. Any sentence would be
the time required to bring about rehabilitation, a period which might be a few
weeks or a lifetime.
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 37 (1972).
9. [0] ur development [of a sentencing system] followed the logic of a seduc-
tive slogan, "Let the punishment fit the criminal, not the crime." Given this prem-
ise, it was but a short step to the indefinite or indeterminate sentence, which made
the need for and response to treatment the formal standard for determining
whether and for how long to imprison. This in turn fathered the two dominant char-
acteristics of the system . . . : wide discretionary power, allegedly so that the of-
fender's treatment could be matched with his individual needs, and the location of
much of this discretionary power with the agencies responsible for protecting so-
ciety from criminals.
Id. at 27.
10. The treatment model tends to be all things to all people.... In fact, the
model has never commanded more than'lip service from most of its more powerful
adherents. The authority given those who manage the system, a power more abso-
lute than that found in any other sphere of law, has conceded the practices carried
on in the name of the treatment model. At every level-from prosecutor to pa-
role-board member-the concept of individualization has been used to justify se-
cret procedures, unreviewable decision making, and an unwillingness to formulate
anything other than the most general rules of policy.
Id. at 37, 39-40.
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tencer's conscious and unconscious biases. The desirability of permit-
ting such discretionary sentencing can only be ascertained if the fac-
tors judges actually use in imposing their sentences are known.
In addition, recent Supreme Court authority recognizing that a
convicted offender has constitutional rights in the sentencing process"
suggests that scientific data on judicial sentencing tendencies may be
very important in delineating the constitutional limitations of discre-
tionary sentencing. While the current rule appears to be that neither
due process nor equal protection prohibits imposition of different sen-
tences on similarly situated offenders, 12 the Court in Furman v.
Georgia'3 recognized that discretionary imposition of the death pen-
alty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. Although Furman was limited to
discretionary death penalty statutes, all nine justices showed sensitivity
to the equal protection and due process arguments applicable to crim-
inal sentencing and recognized that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause "prescribes a flexible, dynamic standard by which to review
criminal punishments, a standard designed to reflect the changing
moral perceptions of the society."' 4 Thus, for the first time society
faces successful constitutional challenges based on the selectivity and
randomness of severe criminal punishments. The sentencer now must
accept that theoretical disputes over public policy in sentencing do not
relieve him of the burden of basic fairness. An argument over sen-
tencing theory or a court challenge to a discretionary sentencing
system can be resolved only if facts that adequately describe the sys-
tem's functioning are available.
Empirical studies of the theories and factors judges use in fash-
ioning their sentences are a recent development. The paucity of statis-
tical studies of sentencing tendencies is indeed remarkable in a system
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967);
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
See also Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to Mc-
Gautha, 49 TEX. L. REV. 25, 27 (1970), and Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory
Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961).
12. Pugh & Carver, supra note 11, at 44-45; see, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1 (1944); see generally Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of
State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961).
13. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40(1972).
14. Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WASH. L. REV.
95, 96 (1972).
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which avows the maximization of personal liberty and freedom as one
of its major tenets. Early studies simply presented data on quantitative
sentence dispositions of judges, emphasizing the disparity observed. 15
These studies assumed that in a large sample of cases the judges would
handle similar distributions of offenders and offenses; the studies thus
concluded that any significant deviation in disposition percentages
from court to court was due to the judge.' 6 While these early studies
aided in supporting or rejecting local attorney folklore, their lack of
true randomization makes their conclusions suspect.
Recently, more sophisticated studies' 7 have attempted to pinpoint
the reasons for the obvious disparity in sentencing by analyzing the
characteristics of the offender, the crime and the judge. These charac-
15. Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & C. 90
(1919); Frankel, The Offender and the Court: A Statistical Analysis ofthe Sentencing of
Delinquents, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & C. 448 (1940); Gaudet, Harris & St. John, Indi-
vidual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
C. 811 (1933); Somit, Tanenhaus & Wilke, Aspects of Judicial Sentencing Behavior, 21
U. Pr-r. L. REV. 613 (1960); S. B. WARNER & H. CABOT, JUDGES AND LAW REFORM
165-68 (1936).
16. See, e.g., Gaudet, Harris & St. John, Individual Differences in the Sentencing
Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & C. 811, 813 (1933). Gaudet's assump-
tion that the caseload of each judge was approximately the same with respect to the pro-
portions of serious and minor crimes and the past record of the offenders, a premise
upon which the whole validity of his study rests, has been seriously questioned. E.
GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING 17-19 (1961). Green states that the "method
by which [Gaudet's] assumption is verified ... does not meet critical standards of ex-
perimental control." Id. at 17. Green points out that the scale of penalties for each of-
fense was quite broad, and an unequal apportionment of various offenses could con-
tribute to the variations between judges. Id. at 17-18. The frequency distribution of each
type of offender between the six judges was information Gaudet must have possessed
but apparently did not choose to publish. Green concludes:
In short, Gaudet's analysis is insensitive to the scope and variability of the legal
factors-the type of crime, the number of criminal acts charged, the circumstances
of the acts charged, the circumstances of the crime, and the offender's past record-
factors which may reasonably affect the judge's selection of a penalty.
Id. at 19. These criticisms apply to any qualitative study which does not attempt to in-
clude an analysis of these types of factors as they independently act upon the total deci-
sion-making process.
17. R. MARTIN, THE DEFENDANT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (U. Tex. Bull. No. 3437,
1934). Martin's technique was simply to compare the frequency of occurrence of a
factor in the offender population with the frequency of occurrence of the same factor in
the total Texas population as provided by the 1930 federal census. Although the conclu-
sions seem intuitively correct, simple tabular correlations are inadequate to determine
any direct causal relationships, and they cannot account for the effects of other factors.
Henry Allen Bullock conducted a study in 1958 of 3,644 inmates in a Texas state
prison to determine the significance of the race factor in the length of prison sentences.
Bullock, Significance ofthe Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 411 (196 1). He catalogued six factors for each man and used a tabular anal-
ysis chi-square contingency coefficient technique to determine differences in observed
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teristics are usually called "factors" or "variables." However, these
studies suffer from methodological shortcomings1 8 and frequently fail
to account for variables such as judges' backgrounds. Nevertheless,
studies which attempt to analyze the variables involved in a particular
case are more useful to the policymaker than the earlier studies in that
they permit the impact of each variable to be evaluated. Once all of
and expected frequencies and to measure the relationship between the main variables.
He concluded that blacks did suffer some degree ofjudicial discrimination. Bullock also
found that offenders who pled guilty received shorter sentences, east Texas generated
longer sentences than did west Texas, and judges in urban areas imposed longer sen-
tences than those in rural areas.
Edward Green studied the sentences resulting from 1,437 convictions during the
years 1956-57 in the nonjury prison court of the Philadelphia Court of Quarter Sessions.
using the chi-square contingency coefficient technique. E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES
IN SENTENCING (1961). Green concluded that the primary "legally relevant" factor af-
fecting sentencing disposition was the nature of the offense. Next in order of importance
was the number of separate criminal acts for which the sentence was being given and the
offender's prior criminal record. Among the "legally irrelevant" factors, preferences
existed for women over men, youth over age and white over black. The study's analysis
also demonstrated disparity in sentencing practices among judges.
A much more advanced study was conducted in Texas in 1966 using the statistical
technique of multiple linear regression analysis to manipulate and analyze data on
1,720 felony cases. Comment, Texas Sentencing Practices: A Statistical Study, 45 TEx.
L. REV. 471 (1967). The study concluded that certain elements in the administration of
the criminal justice system have an unwarranted effect on sentence severity. For exam-
ple, whether the defendant was free prior to trial, whether he was defended by a retained
or appointed defense counsel, and in which trial court he appeared all had a substantial
effect on sentence severity.
In 1968, a research team of Stanford University students undertook a study of sen-
tencing behavior of California first-degree murder juries. A Sttdy of the California Pen-
alty Jury in Firwt-Degree-Mnrder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297 (1969). The study used
the 238 first-degree murder cases tried in California between 1958 and 1966 in which
the penalty was determined by the same jury that determined guilt. Correlations were
run to determine the 78 variables or factors most closely correlated with the penalty var-
iable. Then several partial correlations were run on selected variables to isolate areas
where a reasonable inference of causation could be drawn between the existence of a
factor and the sentence.
Whether or not the defendant's prior criminal record had been introduced into the
record during the penalty trial was found to be the most important factor in deter-
mining the disposition. Jury behavior was found highly predictable when as few as ten
variables were known. The study stressed that some factors not logically related to crim-
inal justice goals in sentencing were apparently important criteria in a jury's delibera-
tive process.
The most recent published statistical study again dealt with Texas sentencing prac-
tices. Johnson, Sentencing in the Criminal District Coart.s, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 944
(1972). Johnson investigated empirical data drawn from cases appearing on the docket
sheets of ten Texas criminal district courts in Harris County (Houston) during the first
six months of 1970. The study analyzed 27 variables relating to the ten individual
judges. It used the Pearson "r" correlation and the Pearson coefficient of variation.
When he examined the disposition alone, Johnson found the expected sentence disparity
between courts. In determining the influence of the variables relating to the judges. the
highest correlation (with severity of sentence) was found in factors relating to judge's
age.
18. See, e.g., notes 54-60 and accompanying text infra.
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the relevant factors are known, this type of study also allows predic-
tion of an offender's sentence.
II. HISTORY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN OF THE
W.S.S.C.J.A. STUDY
The felony sentencing structure in Washington State is an "indeter-
minate sentencing" scheme. 19 The judge does not set the length of a
convicted felon's prison term, but turns him over to a separate agency
which sets the length of his term and periodically reviews the offend-
er's "progress" during incarceration. 20 Although the original legisla-
tive purpose of the Washington sentencing scheme is uncertain, equiv-
alent treatment for similarly situated offenders became one of the
main benefits cited by proponents of Washington's sentencing system.21
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that in Washington felony sentences
even grossly approximate equal treatment in fact. If similar defend-
ants from different communities are sent to the Department of Institu-
tions, the likelihood of equal treatment is theoretically increased be-
cause fewer decision-makers are involved than if each community re-
tains individual control over disposition. But there is a growing trend
to treat the offender in the community whenever possible.22 Individual
trial judges still retain a vast amount of discretion to commit the de-
19. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, March 7, 1935, at 4, col. 4. See note 6 supra and ac-
companying text for a discussion of indeterminate sentencing.
20. WASH. REv. CODE. §§ 9.95.010, .040 (1964). The judge and prosecutor are re-
quired to recommend a minimum sentence, but this recommendation is not binding on
the Board of Prison Terms and Parole. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.030 (1964). Indeed the
recommendations for minimum sentences made by judges and prosecutors are consist-
ently less than the Board's imposed sentence. See WASH. ST. BD. OF PRISON TERMS &
PAROLES, COMPARISON OF MINIMUM TERMS FIXED WITH PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES' RECOMMENDATIONS (1970). The sentences imposed by the Board
are determined after initial testing and diagnosis of the prisoner at the Shelton correc-
tions facility.
21. A substantial majority of the judges interviewed for the present study felt Wash-
ington's sentencing system is "the most advanced, equitable system in use in any of the
fifty states today." W.S.S.C.J.A. STUDY at 77. In its first report to the Legislature, the
Board of Prison Terms and Parole characterized Washington sentencing legislation as
follows:
It is obvious, of course, that one of the primary purposes of this act was to relieve
... the dissimilarity of sentence. To this end, it is a wise and beneficent law. Every
Warden of any penal institution in any state where such a statute does not exist can
testify as to the complaints of inmates as to the dissimilarity of sentence ....
WASH. ST. BD. OF PRISON TERMS & PAROLES, SEVENTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT 40 (1968),
quoting FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT.
22. See, e.g., HUMAN RESOURCES AGENCIES, ST. OF WASH., 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 47,
49(1970).
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fendant or defer or suspend the sentence23 and may impose a wide
variety of conditions on such a deferral or suspension. These condi-
tions may include a term in jail, monetary payments, obtaining and
keeping a job, or participation in a drug rehabilitation program or
other "resocializing" programs such as volunteer work or education.
The statutes give the judge no guidance in imposing such conditions,
or indeed in deciding whether to grant probation in the first instance.
In response to the problems posed by this lack of statutory guid-
ance, the Washington State Superior Court Judges' Association under-
took a study during the summer of 1971 of the sentencing behavior of
its member-judges. Interviews were conducted with sixty-nine of
Washington's ninety-two superior court judges24 in an attempt to iso-
late the particular facts surrounding a defendant and his crime which
have the greatest impact on the judge's decision.
The interviews consisted of three phases: the first phase was de-
voted to the resolution of hypothetical grand larceny cases,25 the
23. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.95.210, .240 (1959).
24. The interviewees included judges in office as little as a week and as long as
thirty years. Also interviewed was a retired judge serving pro tem. Twenty-four judges
were not interviewed: sixteen judges were unavailable during the interview period be-
cause of vacations; two judges were seriously ill; five judges were unwilling to be inter-
viewed and one judge was not interviewed because of project manpower limitations.
Five law students conducted the bulk of the interviews, under the supervision of a
specialist in methodology and Judge David W. Soukup of the King County Superior
Court, director of the project. The interviews were largely free-form. The level of in-
terest and work schedule of each judge dictated different lengths of time for each inter-
view. The interviews ranged from one to four hours in length; the mean was three hours.
Each interviewer attempted to adjust the testing instrument to the particular judge while
following the same basic format and sequence of events in all interviews.
25. The following is a typical hypothetical case presented to a judge:
Edward Gronlund is a 24 year old white male. He is single and has no depen-
dents. Gronlund has lived in Washington less than a year. He is a skilled pipefitter
but is not regularly employed and was not working at the time of the crime. He has
no history of alcoholism but is addicted to heroin. Although he has no psychiatric
history, he is suffering under severe current emotional stress due to the serious ill-
ness of his mother. There is no stable person in the community with whom Gron-
lund has close ties. Gronlund served in the military and was given an honorable
discharge. He is generally neat in appearance.
Gronlund has a juvenile record, and his adult record shows one felony arrest and
conviction, three years ago, for conducting a gambling operation. His record shows
no misdemeanor arrests. Gronlund has spent time in jail and his period of proba-
tion has been successful.
The current conviction, which is not related to regular criminal activity on the
defendant's part, is for taking a $675 garden tractor from Robert Lewis. The de-
fendant had a weapon at the time of the crime. He was not drunk or under the in-
fluence of drugs, but admits that his motive was to obtain money for drugs. The
crime was premeditated.
Guilt was determined by plea. The defendant's attitude toward the court is re-
spectful. A good rehabilitation program has been presented by the probation of-
ficer.
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second stage employed a checklist of the operational facts in isolation,26
and the third stage concluded the interviews with a qualitative
search for attitudes and ideas concerning the functions of the sen-
tencing system.27 The hypothetical cases were the analytical heart of
the study. Each judge who participated was asked to resolve five
cases, all different from the cases given any other judge.28 Each hypo-
thetical was a composite of one fact from each of forty categories of
facts present in grand larceny crimes. 29 The categories of facts and the
frequency of the variables within each category were generated
through searches of previous sentencing studies, discussion with the
study's consultants, 30 and analysis of available Washington State sta-
tistics. An attempt was made to include all categories of factors pos-
sibly influential in sentencing dispositions. Sixteen characteristics re-
lated to the personal background of the defendant, eleven to his crim-
inal background, eight to the offense and five to court procedure.3'
After the interview but prior to the analysis of the sentencing deci-
sions, nine factors relating to the particular judge who resolved the
case were added. 32 The sentencing decision was coded in one of three
ways: probation without jail, probation with jail, and prison.33
26. The list of 115 items presented to each judge included every fact of every
category used in constructing the hypothetical cases. The judge was asked to specify
how strongly the fact would influence his sentencing decision and whether it would
influence it in the direction of leniency or severity. See W.S.S.CJ.A. STUDY at 88 et
seq. for an analysis of the results of this portion of the interview.
27. See W.S.S.C.J.A. STUDY at 49 et seq. for a compilation of the information
derived from this portion of the interview.
28. The hypothetical cases were grouped in sets of five in a non-random
fashion. Each set had some variance in age, race, marital status, work history and
criminal background of the defendants. This was done to assure that disposition by
any particular judge would not consistently be influenced by a unique reaction to
any particular factor. Where possible the hypothetical cases were presented to each
judge sufficiently in advance of his interview to insure that he would have time to
review them carefully before being asked for his disposition. In cases where this
was not possible, the cases were presented to the judge at the beginning of the inter-
view.
29. For example, in the hypothetical case reproduced in note 25 supra, the first
four categories are age, race, sex, and marital status, and the facts chosen from
these categories are 22-29, white, male, and single.
30. The study's consultants included eleven judges, two professors of law and
one professor of sociology.
31. See Appendix I infra for a list of categories and the facts included therein.
32. The factors relating to each judge were (1) the location of his home county,
(2) his age, (3) the length of time he had been on the superior court bench, (4) the
length of time he had practiced law, (5) the law school from which he graduated, (6)
his view of prosecutors' recommendations, (7) when he asks for probation officers'
pre-sentence reports, (8) his view of probation officers' recommendations, and (9)
his view of defense counsel's recommendations.
33. This characterization was deemed the simplest and most universal way of
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The test population consisted of 350 hypothetical cases, 34 each of
which was constructed as follows. The desired frequency of each vari-
able within each fact category was resolved for the population as a
whole. (For example, for the category "sex," available statistics on
grand larceny in Washington indicated about fifteen percent of the
convicted defendants were female.) For each case a code sheet was
compiled, utilizing one fact from each of the categories. (For example,
from the category "sex," the fact "female" might have been chosen.)
Then each code sheet was converted into a prose case history. Con-
centrated effort was devoted to using nonjudgmental descriptive
words and to maintaining a uniform format for all the case histories.
The chief problem in constructing the hypothetical cases was the
distribution of the variables across the population of cases. In some
instances, official statistics provided the requisite distributions, but
often informed guesswork had to be employed. 35 When no informa-
tion on the correlations between the various fact distributions was
available, an attempt was made to randomize the distribution. But
realism and consistency within each case demanded certain departures
from a completely randomized method. For example, the number of
prior felony arrests was obviously correlated with the number of prior
felony convictions (the prior arrests had to equal or exceed the
number of prior convictions); sex was correlated with military service
(a smaller percentage of females than males have served). Also in-
cluded were some less obvious correlations, such as alcoholic history
with number of prior misdemeanor arrests (those with alcoholic his-
tory have a higher percentage of "five or more misdemeanor arrests").
separating the sentences into three grades ranging from "lenient" to "severe." Some
judges would object to the use of the terms "lenient" and "severe" arguing that for
some defendants a probation incorporating many stringent conditions is more "se-
vere" in the conventional sense than an out-and-out incarceration. Other judges dif-
ferentiated between deferred and suspended sentences, but since these were min-
imal in number, their differentiation was not included.
34. Although 350 cases were originally generated, only 320 of these ultimately
were used in the study. The cases eliminated were either not presented to a judge or
not resolved by the judge to whom they were presented.
35. Information available from the King County Prosecutor's Office and the
Office of Probation and Parole and the personal experience of several judges and
prosecutors gave good approximations of the actual breakdown according to age.
sex, race, marital status, number of dependents, length of residence in the state, job
classification, employment history, whether the defendant was under the influence
of drugs or alcohol at the time of the offense, psychiatric history, how guilt was de-
termined, and whether the defendant testified at his trial.
866
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The hypothetical case population was restricted in two other ways:
the charged offense in all cases was grand larceny (one count only)
and all hypothetical offenders were assumed not to be on probation or
parole at the time of the offense. It was necessary to limit the study to
one offense due to the differing types of fact categories present in
other types of offenses. Presence of different types of facts would
make general comparisons more difficult and would lessen the sample
size for each type of offense. Grand larceny was chosen because it
presents the least personalized set of factors. Widely variant judicial
reactions to a defendant convicted of a drug offense or a "personal
threat" crime such as assault could not realistically be duplicated
through a hypothetical case that omitted personal contact between the
judge and the defendant. All hypothetical defendants were assumed
not to be currently on probation or parole because statutory restraints
governing their dispositions would have been different.
Although the hypothetical case approach coupled with a multiple
linear regression analysis provides great insight into the sentencing
process, 36 several limitations must be kept in mind when analyzing the
results of this study. The first and most obvious limitation is the scope
of the empirical data. The study purposely took a very narrow portion
of the total criminal justice spectrum. As a result, no conclusions can
be drawn about other parts of the criminal justice system that were
not examined. Sentencing may in fact be subsidiary to or controlled
by other facets of the criminal justice process such as police screen-
ing,37 the availability of probation department facilities,38 or plea bar-
gaining in the prosecutor's office.39 However, the study does describe
controlling factors to the extent that sentencing by the judge is inde-
pendent and not determined by extra-judicial agents.
The second limitation upon any general conclusions from the study
is the nature of the data. As mentioned above, the hypothetical cases
resolved by the interviewed judges were all larceny cases because in-
36. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the tech-
nique of multiple linear regression analysis.
37. See, e.g., Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Jastice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
38. Over half of the judges interviewed in the course of this study indicated the
availability of adequate probation programs heavily influenced the sentence they ac-
corded the offender. See W.S.S.CJ.A. STUDY at 68.
39. See, e.g., Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain
Justice, 46J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956).
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clusion of more than one category of crimes would have expanded the
scope of the data beyond manageable limits. Many judges frankly
admitted that their response to sentencing was dependent upon the
nature of the crime involved. The study does describe the directions
this dependency assumes, but the empirical data are limited to grand
larcenies.
The third major limitation of the study is the method of analysis.
The experimental design does not allow determination of what caused
a particular decision in a particular case. The purpose of the study
was to examine the system as a whole, so an analytical method was
chosen to achieve that end alone.
The fourth limitation to the study is inherent in the hypothetical
case approach. The cases presented to the judges were not real, so the
results express what a particular judge believed he would do in a partic-
ular situation. In fact, a judge's historical record may be quite dif-
ferent from what the judge believes he does. This limitation does not
lessen the value of the study, however, because the decisions rendered
in hypothetical cases best portray which factors the judges believe
should control sentencing.
III. RESULTS
The proponents of indeterminate and discretionary sentencing
argue that such sentencing promotes the "rehabilitative ideal." This
argument assumes that the sentencer has the capability of identifying
the causes of particular criminal behavior and removing those causes
through treatment, thereby rehabilitating the offender toward a
law-abiding life in the future. The wide acceptance of indeterminate
and discretionary sentencing throughout the United States suggests a
belief that such a "help the offender" attitude is (1) feasible, (2) consti-
tutionally permissible, and (3) desirable. The results of the Wash-
ington State Superior Court Judges' Association study challenge the
first two beliefs and compel review of the third.
Table 1 presents the beta coefficients of the major determinants of
felony sentencing calculated from the data40 generated in the
W.S.S.C.J.A. Study. The beta coefficients for the entire set of
40. A multiple linear regression analysis was used. See section IV. Analysis ofthe
Data: Methodology, infra, for a comparision of this method of analysis with other pos-
sible approaches and for a discussion of the inherent limitations of this method. The pro-
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TABLE 1
MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF FELONY SENTENCING
BETA
COEFFICIENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
+ .306 Number of defendant's prior felony arrests
+ .257 Nature of defendant's most serious prior felony conviction
+.194 Length of time since trial judge was admitted to the bar
-. 159 Defendant's attitude was respectful
- .152 Defendant's motive was to obtain money for drugs
-. 139 Defense counsel presented a rehabilitation program to the
court before sentencing
+ .136 Defendant's race was white
- .130 Defendant's motive was "whim"
+.126 Type of crime was larceny by possession of stolen goods
-. 125 Length of judge's tenure on bench
+.123 The judge's philosophy of defense recommendations
+.122 The victim of the crime was a private individual
+.121 The judge became a lawyer through private study without
attending a law school
+.118 The defendant had previously'served time in prison
-. 112 The judge's philosophy of probation officer recommendations
-. 111 The defendant had a prior history of psychiatric problems
sixty-eight independent variables appear in Appendix II. A positive
value means that the variable contributes to incarceration, and a neg-
ative value means the variable contributes to probation. The degree of
contribution is indicated by the magnitude of the coefficient. Beta
cedure used for the calculation of the beta coefficients, BMD02R, is available'at most
university computer installations. Computational methods are available in many stan-
dard texts. See, e.g., A.S. GOLDBERGER, ECONOMETRIC THEORY (1964).
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coefficients vary ordinarily from - 1 to + 1.41 It is evident that none of
the independent variables overwhelms any of the others; sentencing
for the most part is a consequence of the interaction of a number of
factors rather than one or two factors. The total set of independent
variables considered in this study accounts for approximately fifty
percent of the variance observed in the sentences assigned the hypo-
thetical case population; 42 that is, more than fifty percent of the varia-
tion in sentencing is explained by the independent variables included
in the study. 43 Therefore, because of the broad range of independent
variables and because of the way in which they explain the variation,
Table 1 contains the major determinants of sentencing.
The study clearly demonstrates that the following factors played an
important role in influencing the sentencing judge's decision: the race
of the defendant, the judge's educational background, the length of
time the judge had been a lawyer and had served on the bench, the
number of felony arrests (not convictions) the defendant had experi-
enced, the attitude of the defendant as perceived by the judge, and the
judge's personal philosophy of probation officer and defense attorney
recommendations.
Table 1 shows that white defendants were treated more severely
than non-white defendants, reflecting a systemic bias against whites in
a hypothetical case situation. Although it is beyond the scope of the
data to explain why such a systemic bias exists, it is likely, in the au-
thors' view, that some Washington State judges favored non-whites in
this hypothetical study because of a conscious racial preference.44 It is
possible that some judges feel an identity and familiarity with a white
41. Under certain circumstances the beta coefficient may exceed an absolute value
of one. This most often occurs in cases involving unusual combinations of negative and
positive correlations among the independent variables and the dependent variable.
Since such unusual combinations were not present. the possibility of a coefficient ex-
ceeding one is not a concern.
42. The squared multiple correlation coefficient which may be interpreted as the
proportion of explained variance to total variance is .49 1. This is a surprisingly high
proportion. See H. BLALOCK. SOCIAL STATISTICS 354-57 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
BLALOCK] for a discussion of how to interpret the squared multiple correlation co-
efficient.
43. It is assumed that the list of variables in Appendix I infra is not exhaustive of all
the variables present in a sentencing decision. See note 30 and accompanying text .wtpra
for a discussion of how the variables under study were selected.
44. In fact at least two judges participating in the interviews commented that they
consciously attempt to treat non-white defendants more leniently than white because
they recognize the likelihood of unconscious prejudice on their part against blacks and
other minorities.
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defendant's cultural background which makes them more willing to
impute blame to the white offender than to his environment, 45 thereby
creating a presumption or bias operating against whites that is solely
racial in character.
Other striking biases emerge from a review of the sixteen most
important factors in sentencing presented in Table 1. Much of the var-
iance in severity of the sentences is accounted for by the judge's edu-
cational and professional background, completely apart from any
facts related to the offender or the offense. Three of the sixteen most
important factors are related to the judge's experience level and the
law school he attended. Again, these factors certainly are related to
other data not under study. 46 For instance, the undergraduate creden-
tials and cultural background of a judge affected whether he was able
to attend law school. Further, factors involving the judge's experience
level are probably related in part to how many criminals the judge has
sentenced in the past as well as his attitudes at the time he went on the
bench. It would not be surprising if a judge found it more difficult to
distinguish between individual defendants over time as the number of
defendants he has sentenced increases. In any event, it is clear from
the data that the sentence is heavily influenced by who the judge is
and what his background is.47
Three factors in Table 1 which related to the offender's past record
show that the defendant's prior incarceration and the number of his
prior arrests (particularly felony arrests) rather than convictions are
influential elements. The judges apparently consider both arrests and
prior prison terms highly accurate measures of criminality, or at least
did so in the hypothetical cases. If this is correct, what has happened
to the presumption of innocence where there is no conviction? And if
an earlier prison sentence tends to make a later felony sentence more
severe, isn't this double punishment for the earlier crime? Several pos-
sible explanations for this result exist. First, judges may assume that a
defendant with a prior prison record is a hardened criminal. Second,
judges probably rely on the arrest data because a Washington statu-
45. It is likely that judges feel the community gives more advantages to white of-
fenders than to non-white offenders and thus feel there is a greater likelihood that
non-white crime is environmental in origin.
46. A limitation on the study data was the inclusion of only nine information bits
about each judge; see note 32 and accompanying text supra.
47. These results are strikingly similar to the findings of the Houston study, John-
son, supra note 17, at 62-64.
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tory provision allows deferred sentences which are later cleared en-
tirely from the conviction record, thus leaving only the felony arrest as
evidence of the earlier transgression. 48 Finally, the judges may place
great confidence in police analysis of a citizen's criminality, i.e., the
frequency of his arrest.
Six factors on the list relate to the offender's motive at the time of
crime and attitude during the trial. An offender's attitude towards re-
form, repentance or rehabilitation is important. These six factors also
seem to suggest that "impulse" and drug offenders are treated leni-
ently and voluntary"9 criminals severely. The apparent importance of
the judge's subjective evaluation of the defendant's attitude and mo-
tive is not at all reassuring, given the cultural and racial biases already
discussed. Criminal lawyers seem to recognize the importance of this
judicial perception when they advise their clients to wear suits and cut
their hair for trial.
The study findings seriously challenge the underlying assumption of
indeterminate and discretionary sentencing that it is possible to indi-
vidualize a sentence for a particular offender. The results of the study
were generated by moderate judges,50 yet the individualized sentences
of these non-aberrant judges were directly dependent upon the judge's
background and unconscious biases rather than upon the defendant's
needs. Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to predict
whether the same problem would arise if the sentencing decision were
made by someone other than the judge, a calculated guess is that un-
conscious biases in human decision-making are not limited to judges
and probably would appear in any group of decision-makers given the
same breadth of discretion. The question then becomes whether it is
possible to truly individualize sentences by only considering factors
related to the offender and the offense. Stated another way, if sentenc-
ing is to be individualized, is it possible to keep the decision from
being controlled by factors dependent on who the decision-maker is?
The W.S.S.C.J.A. findings raise a second serious challenge to dis-
cretionary, individualized sentencing. Any sentencing system must
48. WASH. Rev. CODE § 9.95.210(1959).
49. "Voluntary" means premeditated or thoughtful crimes (e.g., sale of stolen
goods) in which the offender has a chance to consider his acts. The judges often men-
tioned during the study that offenders trying to support a drug habit were "impulse-
criminals.
50. See note 69 and accompanying text infra.
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withstand the constitutional tests of due process and equal protection
and must avoid cruel or unusual punishment in its operation. For the
first time, studies such as this one allow review of the standards used
by sentencing decision-makers. Currently there is little case law elab-
orating the constitutional requirements surrounding discretionary
sentencing5' because the courts have had little data or evidence with
which to identify the standards used. However, it would appear that if
data similar to the W.S.S.C.J.A. study reveal that current determi-
nants for inflicting severe discretionary criminal punishments are fac-
tors such as racial bias, the constitutionality of discretionary sen-
tencing will be subject to severe sixth and fourteenth amendment scru-
tiny.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: METHODOLOGY
The raw data collected during the interviews was analyzed to ascer-
tain which of the following are important determinants in sentencing:
the defendant's criminal history, race, or sex; the offense; the conduct
of the case; or the characteristics of the judge. The question is: which
factors are most important in determining sentence severity, and how
much more do they affect the sentence than the other factors? To
make this determination, standardized multiple linear regression must
be used.
In multiple linear regression, coefficients are selected to best fit the
following equation:
Y = BIX,+B 2X 2 + ... + B!nXn + A
where Y represents the dependent variable and the X's are the inde-
pendent variables.5 2 The B's, called regression coefficients, are the
partial derivatives (rates of change) of the dependent variable with
respect to the independent variable of which it is a coefficient, control-
ling for all of the other independent variables. Thus, any single regres-
sion coefficient may be interpreted as the amount of change produced
in the dependent variable when a given independent variable is in-
creased one unit and all the other variables are held constant. How-
ever, in order to compare the B's directly for an assessment of their
51. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
52. See BLALOCK at 346.
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relative direct effects, it is necessary that all of the independent varia-
bles be measured in the same units or be standardized. Since the
W.S.S.C.J.A. data were not measured in the same units, the variables
must be standardized-expressed in terms of standard deviations from
their respective means. 53 Standardization allows direct comparison of
the regression coefficients-now called "beta" coefficients. The beta
coefficient is a measure of relative direct effect, controlling for the
influence of all of the other independent variables. Since this is pre-
cisely what is needed in order to assess the relative effects of the dif-
ferent independent variables on sentencing, the analysis in this com-
ment uses standardized multiple regression coefficients.
Several other analytical approaches are available but are less satis-
factory than multiple linear regression in analyzing raw data such as
that obtained in the W.S.S.C.J.A. study. The first possible approach
would inspect the correlation coefficient54 of each of the facts (inde-
pendent variables) with the observed sentence (dependent variable).
Under such an approach, it is presumed that the independent varia-
bles more highly correlated with the dependent variable are more
important than those less correlated. This type of strategy was em-
ployed by Johnson5 5 in a study of ten criminal district courts in Harris
County (Houston), Texas. In analyzing the effects of various variables
in the judge's background on sentencing, he found, for instance, that
both age and length of time in private law practice correlated very
highly 56 (.93) with the severity of sentences in theft cases. Although
these findings are interesting, it is certain that the high correlation of
length of private practice with the severity of a sentence is due in large
part to the age of the judge; the reverse is just as certain. Stated an-
other way, the raw correlation coefficients are not good evidence of
direct effect because some of the effect of each of the independent
53. The standard deviation is a parameter of the normal distribution. It may be de-
scribed as the root mean square of the deviations of the variables about the mean. This
sort of a unit is used because of its favorable mathematical properties for this kind of
analysis.
54. A correlation coefficient measures the amount or degree of association of two
variables. The more closely related the variables, the higher will be the correlation. The
correlation coefficient always varies between + I and - I. See BLALOCK at 285 for
computation formulas.
55. Johnson, Sentencing in the Crininal District Courts, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 944
(1972), discussed in note 17 suhpra.
56. Since the correlation coefficient is never greater than one, a .93 correlation is
very high and indicates that the sentence is almost a complete function of the judge's
age and length of time in private law practice.
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variables has been "stolen" from the others. It would be more desir-
able to know the magnitude of the effect of age on sentence inde-
pendent of any effect length of private practice may have, and vice
versa. In order to ascertain this independent effect, some method is
needed for controlling the interrelationships among the independent
variables. Statistical control of the interrelationships requires knowl-
edge of the correlations of the independent variables among them-
selves.57
Another analytical approach which is less satisfactory than multiple
linear regression is partial correlation. In a California study of the fel-
ony sentencing patterns of juries,58 partial correlations59 were used as
a method of determining the effect of a particular independent vari-
able on the dependent variable. In partial correlation the investigator
statistically removes any variation due to the control variables (varia-
tion not being observed), thus leaving an uncontaminated correlation.
This is satisfactory for a study of any one independent variable in a
set, but if a comparison of the uncontaminated effect of each of the
independent variables is desired so that an assessment of their relative
importance with respect to each other can be obtained, partial corre-
lations are not satisfactory. A common "metric" or standard for com-
parison is needed. A common standard cannot be established in par-
tial correlation since variation is extracted from the dependent vari-
able as well as from the independent variable. Thus no standard unit
of measure is possible since the one common element in each of the
comparisons, the dependent variable, is controlled to a different de-
gree in each partial correlation. Therefore, an investigator who used
partial correlations might be able to say that the correlation of a par-
ticular independent variable with the dependent variable "survived"
the statistical controls (i.e., the correlation remained about the same
after control as before control), but he could not legitimately say that
it survived to a greater or lesser degree than did any of the other inde-
pendent variables.
57. Correlations among the various independent variables were not presented in the
Johnson study. The only correlations presented were those between the independent var-
iables and the dependent variable, the sentence.
58. A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 1297 (1969), discussed in note 17 supra.
59. A partial correlation is a correlation between two variables that is controlled
for the effects of a third variable. See BLALOCK at 333-36 for computational formulas
and a more extended description.
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In the earliest sentencing studies which used tabular analysis, only
very limited questions were answered, and many competing explana-
tions remained. Later studies using the ordinary correlation coefficient
did not broaden the scope of questions which could be answered. It
was found, for instance, that the judge's age was highly correlated
with the severity of sentence. 60 However, since this correlation might
be due to the causal effect of other independent variables with which
it was correlated, alternative explanations still were not eliminated.
The use of partial correlations increases the number of questions
which can be answered satisfactorily. This technique can determine
whether the relationship of age and sentence "survives" when the ef-
fects of other independent variables are controlled. But this method,
too, fails when the relative influence of each factor or independent
variable upon the severity of sentence is sought to be determined.
Thus multiple linear regression analysis constitutes the best tech-
nique for answering the questions of how judges sentence. However,
the W.S.S.C.J.A. study data present a methodological problem re-
garding the use of a multiple regression model. The multiple regres-
sion technique was designed for data that have interval or ratio prop-
erties, i.e., data measured with numbers that have multiplicative and
additive properties. The W.S.S.C.J.A. study data, on the other hand,
include nominal and ordinal scales as well as interval and ratio
scales. 61 Multiple regression will handle nominal scales if each category
of the scale is treated as a separate variable having two possible val-
ues: zero or one (one if the case falls in that category, and zero if
not). Thus race is not treated as a single variable, but as four varia-
bles-black or non-black, white or non-white, Indian or non-Indian,
and Mexican-American or non-Mexican-American. Multiple regres-
sion analysis of ordinal variables is harder to justify, though there is
sufficient evidence62 to suggest that basic conclusions are relatively un-
60. See Johnson, supra note 17.
61. A ratio .caled variable may be expressed in terms of real numbers. An interval
scaled variable is essentially arbitrary with respect to zero; in other words, the scale
could be moved up and down on the real number scale as long as the relative positions
of the scale were kept the same. An ordinal scale carries information only about the rel-
ative order of the items; that is, it is not known whether a certain value is twice or three
times the value of another, but it is known that it is greater. A nominal scale is one in
which no value at all may possibly be assigned to the categories. An example of a nom-
inal scale is sex; it varies between male and female, but no numbers could be assigned
which would distinguish one as higher or lower than the other. See BLALOCK at 12-15.
62. Boyle, Path Analysis and Ordinal Data, 75 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 461 (1970).
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touched when ordinal variables are treated as interval. At any rate
ordinal variables can be included in the analysis with some recoding
to maximize interpretability.6 3
A special problem existed in the W.S.S.C.J.A. study because the
dependent variable, the sentence, was ordinal. The W.S.S.C.J.A. study
data allowed only the values of one (probation without jail), two (pro-
bation with jail), or three (prison),64 but the &omputed expected value
given the estimated standardized regression coefficients was not re-
stricted in value. An adequate justification for proceeding with an or-
dinal dependent variable in this case is an assumption that an essen-
tially interval variable is being trichotomized. Thus it is possible to
have an interval expected value even though the observed response
has only three possible values.65
Two characteristics of the sample used for this analysis bear men-
tioning. First, since the sample of hypothetical cases is not a proba-
bility sample,66 there is no possibility of generalizing to a population.
Therefore, usual statistical methods67 will not help in distinguishing
significant coefficients from nonsignificant ones. This is not really a
problem since comparison of the effects of the different independent
variables and the interpretation of their relative position is not af-
fected by the non-randomness of the sample. Second, earlier analysis
of this same data suggested that there were clear differences in the
manner in which the independent variables affected the sentencing
patterns of severe or lenient judges as opposed to more moderate
judges.6 8 On the basis of the previous analysis the sample was divided
into three groups: severe, moderate, and lenient. By far the greatest
number of judges fell into the middle category. The conclusions pre-
sented in this paper do not apply to the extreme judges, since an at-
tempt to apply the present analysis to the extreme judges (both severe
63. For example, "nature of most serious felony conviction" was coded: - I = less
serious than current offense; 0 = similar to current offense; + I = more serious than
current offense.
64. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
65. It is also true that some heteroskedacisity is produced, but since we do not in-
tend to invoke statistical tests of significance this is not a serious danger. See BLALOCK at
279.
66. See notes 35, 36 and accompanying text supra for details of the present sample.
See BLALOCK at 392 for a discussion of sampling problems.
67. For example, the F test. See BLALOCK at 302.
68. W.S.S.CJ.A. STUDY at 135-36.
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and lenient) failed because of severe multi-collinearity. 69 Nor may the
conclusions be applied to other judges not included in the study, such
as Washington municipal court judges, federal judges, or judges from
other states, though it is hoped that the results of this study will en-
courage others to extend this type of research to these groups.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the results of the W.S.S.C.J.A. study should be evaluated
in light of the reservations discussed above, the data are useful in con-
firming several conclusions drawn in earlier studies.70 Race is signifi-
cant. The previous criminal record of the offender is much more im-
portant than the nature of the current crime. Factors unrelated to the
defendant's culpability or rehabilitation potential have great impact
on the sentence. Factors from the judge's background such as educa-
tion and length of legal practice are extremely important in ac-
counting for particular sentences. The results of this and other existing
empirical studies of sentencing practices clearly demonstrate depend-
ence on factors unrelated to any justifiable goal of individualized sen-
tencing.
One partial solution to these unacceptable sentencing practices is to
enunciate standards for sentencing. Professor Kadish argues that wide
discretion without standards in sentencing must be subjected to equal
protection and due process review, pointing out that the essential
question is the extent to which, in a government of law rather than of
men, rules must control the making of critical judicial decisions. 71
Both the ABA and the Model Sentencing Act72 advocate preserving
69. Multi-collinearity is high intercorrelation of the independent variables. In this
case many of the independent variables were correlated perfectly with each other and
therefore complete functions of each other. See BLALOCK at 268.
70. See note 17 supra.
71. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police in Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962).
72. ABA PROJ. ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 14 (1967); ADVISORY COUNCIL OF
JUDGES OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT
art. I, § 1 (1963), reprinted in ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING, supra at 330.
There has been serious, intense scholarship and proposed law reforms in sentencing.
Most notable, in addition to the MODEL SENTENCING ACT supra, and the ABA STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING sulpra, are the MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official
Draft 1962): the proposed new Federal Criminal Code, NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT, PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
(1971), reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomtn. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
878
Vol. 48: 857, 1973
Discretion in Felony Sentencing
the principle of individualization while eliminating the extremes in
sentencing behavior by specifying factors which a judge must con-
sider. Unfortunately, the ABA approach will not resolve the use of
the questionable factors isolated by the W.S.S.C.J.A. study, for the
factors in Table 1 are not those used by aberrant judges;73 they are
the factors used in the ordinary sentencing decision. Since factors such
as the judge's age and legal education are presumably unconscious
considerations, they cannot be controlled by specifying conscious
"standards for discretion."
An alternative approach to controlling undesirable biases74 is reas-
sessment of individualization and its role in criminal sentencing. The
proponents of individualized sentencing argue that courts should be
allowed to treat the offender in any of a multitude of ways designed to
eliminate his criminal behavior. This "I know what's best for you" at-
titude toward criminal sentencing has fostered a huge amount of dis-
cretion as well as secrecy in decision-making. This excess of discretion
would be shocking if encountered in any other area of the law.75 The
entire sentencing apparatus-from presentence report to parole board
hearings and parole officer reports-is shrouded in secrecy and
hidden from the offender's review.
One possible means of reducing the breadth of discretion is to limit
the cases in which discretion can be exercised. Statutes could define
precisely those instances when a sentencer may use discretion or the
statutes could place the burden on the defendant to invoke the court's
discretion and show it should be exercised in his particular case. This
approach is already used successfully in the substantive criminal law,7 6
and its benefits would be just as great in sentencing.
Controlling discretion is not easy, but a start can be made by ad-
mitting there is a problem. In the words of Judge Frankel:77
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 129 (1971); and ABA
PROJ. ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPEL-
LATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Approved Draft 1968).
73. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
74. Policies (or biases) in sentencing are not bad per se. The problem arises when
these policies are neither articulated nor agreed upon, subjecting defendants to dramati-
cally different treatment without any justification or approval by society as a whole.
75. Surely it is no coincidence that the business community has lobbied long and
hard for precise controls on discretionary governmental authority in areas such as tax
and business and commercial transactions. Yet no precise controls limiting judicial and
administrative discretion are found in criminal sentencing.
76. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.01, 4.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
77. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1, 54 (1972).
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Sentencing is today a wasteland in the law. It calls, above all, for
regulation by law. There is an excess of discretion given to officials
whose entitlement to such power is established by neither professional
credentials nor performance. Some measures already in existence-
such as sentencing councils and appellate review-seem desirable
because they operate to channel the exercise of discretion. On the
other hand, the evil of unbounded discretion is enhanced by the un-
critical belief that a beneficent "individualization" is achieved
through indeterminate sentencing. Indeterminancy in its most enthu-
siastic forms takes on its literal dictionary quality of vagueness; it
means conferring of power to extend or terminate confinement where
the grounds of the power have been misconceived and the occasions
for its exercise are not ascertainable.
Barbara L. Johnston,*
Nicholas P. Millert
Ronald Schoenberg,+
and
Laurence Ross Weatherly
* B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1969; J.D., University of Washington,
1973.
t B.A.. University of Washington, 1966;J.D., 1973.
B.A., University of Washington, 1969; M.A., 1972.
B.B.A., Pacific Lutheran University, 1968; J.D., University of Washington, 1973.
880
Vol. 48: 857, 1973
Discretion in Felony Sentencing
APPENDIX I
TABLE OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
This table lists the independent variables used in the authors'
analysis of the W.S.S.C.J.A. study. The right hand column presents
the assigned values possible' in any given hypothetical case history
used in the study.
A. DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL HISTORY
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE POSSIBLE VALUES
1. Defendant's age (1) 18-21 years old
2. Defendant's race was black
3. Defendant's race was Indian
4. Defendant's race was white
5. Defendant was male
6. Defendant was single
7. Defendant was divorced
or separated
8. Defendant was married
9. Number of defendant's
dependents
10. Length of defendant's residence
in the State of Washington
11. Defendant's job classification
was professional or managerial
12. Defendant's job classification
was white collar
(2) 22-29
(3) 30-39
(4) 40-49
(5) 50 and older
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(1)0
(2) 1 or 2
(3) 3 or more
(1) less than 1 year
(2) 1-5 years
(3) more than 5 years
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
13. Defendant's job classification
was "skilled"
14. Defendant was regularly
employed
15. Defendant was employed at
the time of crime
16. Defendant had a history of
alcoholism
17. Defendant had a history of
no drug use
18. Defendant had a history of
use of marijuana
19. Defendant had a history of use of
amphetamines or barbituates
20. Defendant had a history of
psychiatric disturbances
21. Defendant was suffering from
current emotional problems
22. Defendant had close ties to
a responsible member of the
community
23. Defendant was honorably dis-
charged from military service
24. Defendant received a less than
honorable discharge from
military service
25. Defendant presented a neat
appearance
B. DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL R
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
1. Defendant had a juvenile record
2. Number of defendant's prior
felony arrests
POSSIBLE VALUES
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
ECORD
POSSIBLE VALUES
(0) no
(1) yes
(1) none
(2) 1
(3)2
(4) 3 or more
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
3. Number of defendant's prior
felony convictions
4. Time of defendant's most recent
prior felony conviction
5. Nature of defendant's most
serious prior felony conviction
6. Number of defendant's prior
misdemeanor arrests
7. Time of defendant's most
recent misdemeanor arrest
8. Defendant's current conviction
was related to other criminal
activity
9. Defendant had served time in
prison
10. Defendant had served time in jail
11. Defendant's prior probation
or parole record
C. FACTS OF THE CRIME
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
1. The victim was an individual
2. The victim was a business
3. The amount of the larceny
POSSIBLE VALUES
(1) none
(2) 1
(3) 2
(4) 3 or more
(1) less than 5 years ago
(2) more than 5 years ago
(1) less serious than current
offense
(2) as serious as current
(3) more serious than current
(1) none
(2) 1-4
(3) 5 or more
(0) none
(1) less than 1 year ago
(2) more than 1 year ago
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(- 1) yes with at least 1 failure
(0) none
(+ 1) yes with no failures
POSSIBLE VALUES
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(1) less than $100
(2) $100-$499
(3) $500-$999
(4) more than $1,000
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
4. The type of larceny was
possession of stolen goods
5. The type of larceny was theft
6. Defendant carried a weapon
at time of crime
7. Defendant was drunk at time
of crime
8. Defendant was under influence
of drugs at time of crime
9. Defendant's motive was money
for drugs
10. Defendant's motive was hardship
11. Defendant's motive was unknown
12. Defendant's motive was whim
13. The crime was premeditated
D. FACTS OF THE TRIAL
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1. Defendant's guilt was determined
by plea
2. Defendant's guilt was determined
by jury trial
3. Defendant's testimony at trial
was believable
4. Defendant's testimony at trial
was unbelievable
5. Defendant's attitude in court
was respectful
6. The type of rehabilitation
presented to the court
7. Defense counsel presented
a rehabilitation program
POSSIBLE VALUES
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
POSSIBLE VALUES
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) no
(1) yes
(0) none
(1) mediocre
(2) good
(0) no
(1) yes
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E. PERSONAL DATA ON THE SENTENCING JUDGE*
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE POSSIBLE VALUES
1. Judge's philosophy toward prose- (1) does not consider
cuting tattorneys' ,recommenda- (2) considers, but decides
tions independently
(3) varies with the particular
prosecutor
(4) considers strongly but is
generally more lenient
(5) generally follows
(6) follows if deferred
sentence is recommended
2. In what cases does sentencing (1) all, or almost all
judge order presentence report (2) when unsure of sentence
but tending toward
probation
(3) when unsure but tending
toward incarceration
(4) usually, unless defendant
has regular criminal activ-
ity or crime was violent
(5) never if the plea was
bargained
(6) only if there was a plea or
important information is
lacking
(7) seldom unless defendant
was previously on proba-
tion or either attorney
requests
(8) almost never
3. The sentencing judge's philosophy (1) does not consider
toward probation officers' (2) varies with the probation
recommendations officer
The information on the sentencing judges was obtained from two sources. During
the interviews, each judge was asked to express his view of prosecutor, defense counsel,
and probation officer recommendations and also his procedure for deciding to require a
presentence report. These answers were then summarized and grouped according to
similarity of responses. The personal history data on each judge were obtained from
legal directories. The data on each judge were added to the particular hypothetical cases
he sentenced. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE POSSIBLE VALUES
(3) considers strongly but
tends to be more severe
(4) generally follows
4. The sentencing judge's philosophy (1) does not consider
toward defense recommendations (2) considers for rehabilita-
tion program
(3) varies with attorney
(4) considers strongly with
reservations
5. The sentencing judge's age (1) 41 or younger
(2) 42-51
(3) 52-61
(4) 62-71
(5) 72 or older
6. The year the judge was appointed (1) 1970 or later
or elected to the bench (2) 1960-1969
(Length of time on bench) (3) 1950-1959
(4) 1940-1949
(5) 1939 or earlier
7. Date admitted to Bar (1) 1960 or later
(Length of time a lawyer) (2) 1950-1959
(3) 1940-1949
(4) 1930-1939
(5) 1920-1929
8. The judge became a lawyer (0) no
through private study (1) yes
9. The judge attended the University (0) no
of Washington Law School (1) yes
10. The judge attended a law school (0) no
in the Northwest other than (1) yes
University of Washington or
Gonzaga University
11. The judge attended law school (0) no
outside the Northwest (1) yes
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APPENDIX II
TABLE OF BETA COEFFICIENTS
This table presents the results of the authors' analysis of the W.S.S.
C.J.A. study data. The independent variables are listed in descending
order of importance.* The size, or magnitude, of the beta coefficient
is evidence of the relative importance of the variable in the sentencing
decision. The sign (+ or -) of the coefficient indicates the direction of
influence of the variable. A positive sign means the variable tends the
sentence toward incarceration as the value of the variable increases. A
minus sign means the variable tends the sentence toward probation
without jail as the value of the variable increases. Appendix I lists the
possible values for each independent variable.
BETA
COEFFI-
CIENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
+ .306 B-2 Number of defendant's prior felony arrests
±t.257 B-5 Nature of defendant's most serious prior felony
conviction
+ .194 E-7 Date sentencing judge admitted to Bar
-. 159 D-5 Defendant's attitude in court was respectful
-. 152 C-9 Defendant's motive was money for drugs
-. 139 D-7 Defense counsel presented a rehabilitation program
+.136 A-4 Defendant's race was white
-. 130 C-12 Defendant's motive was whim
+.126 C-4 Type of larceny was possession of stolen goods
-. 125 E-6 The year judge was appointed to bench
+.123 E-4 The judge's philosophy toward defense counsel rec-
ommendations
+ .122 C-1 The victim was an individual
* The legal reader should use caution in interpreting the regression coefficients.
The correlations, and therefore the observed regression coefficients, have an accuracy
within approximately h. 1 of the true value of the independent variable. This level of
accuracy is only a rule of thumb because the ordinal and nominal character of the
variables obviates dramatic claims of accuracy. It is not possible to construct confidence
intervals (mathematical intervals within which the "true value" is probable) for the
regression coefficients because of the inapplicability of assumptions necessary
for meaningful confidence intervals (e.g., homoskedasicity, see note 65 supra;
generalization to a wider population, see note 66 and accompanying text supra).
In others words, the reader should be skeptical of the regression coefficients as they
decrease in absolute value. The smaller the size of the coefficient, the more likely the
coefficient is a product of a mathematical artifact and not good evidence of the role of
the variable.
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BETA
COEFFI-
CIENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
+.121 E-8 The judge became an attorney through private
study
+.118 B-9 Defendant has served time in prison
-. 112 E-3 Judge's philosophy toward probation officers'
recommendations
-. 111 A-20 Defendant had a history of psychiatric disturbances
+.103 C-2 Victim was a business
+.102 B-8 Defendant's current conviction was related to other
criminal activity
-. 102 B-7 Time of defendant's most recent misdemeanor
arrest
+ .099 E-9 Judge attended University of Washington Law
School
+ .094 D-3 Defendant's testimony at trial was believable
+ .094 C-7 Defendant was drunk at time of crime
+.089 A-14 Defendant was regularly employed
- .089 C-1 I Defendant's motive was unknown
+ .084 D-2 Defendant's guilt was determined by jury
- .080 C-8 Defendant was under influence of drugs at time
of crime
+ .072 A-3 Defendant's race was Indian
-. 072 E-5 Judge's age
-. 071 A- 17 Defendant had a history of no drug use
-. 071 A-25 Defendant presented a neat appearance
+ .067 A- 19 Defendant had a history of use of amphetamines
or barbituates
- .065 B-3 Number of defendant's prior felony convictions
+ .064 A-1 Defendant's age
+ .062 E-I Judge's philosophy toward prosecuting attorneys'
recommendations
-. 062 A-13 Defendant'sjob classification was "skilled"
+ .059 D-4 Defendant's testimony was unbelievable
-. 055 B-10 Defendant had served time in jail
+ .055 B-6 Number of defendant's prior misdemeanor arrests
-. 054 A-8 Defendant was married
+ .053 A-6 Defendant was single
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BETA
COEFFI-
CIENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
+ .051 B-1 Defendant had a juvenile record
+ .050 D-1 Defendant's guilt was determined by plea
+ .050 E-2 Cases in which judge orders presentence report
-. 049 C-3 Amount of the larceny
-. 048 A-18 Defendant had a history of marijuana use
-. 045 A-23 Defendant was honorably discharged from military
service
-. 043 A-9 Number of defendant's dependents
+ .042 EL1 1 Judge attended law school outside Northwest
-. 041 B-1 1 Defendant's prior probation or parole record
+.037 A-7 Defendant was divorced or separated
+ .037 A-12 Defendant's job classification was "white collar"
-. 036 A-16 Defendant had a history of alcoholism
+ .035 A-15 Defendant was employed at time of crime
+ .032 E-10 Judge attended a Northwest law school other than
University of Washington or Gonzaga University
-. 029 B-4 Time of defendant's most recent prior felony
conviction
-. 029 A-5 Defendant was male
+ .028 D-6 Type of rehabilitation program presented to court
+ .026 C-13 The crime was premeditated
+ .026 A-24 Defendant received a less than honorable discharge
from military service
-. 023 C-6 Defendant carried a weapon at time of crime
+ .023 A-2 Defendant's race was black
-. 022 A-22 Defendant had close ties to a responsible member
of the community
+ .022 C-5 Type of larceny was theft
-. 021 A-10 Length of defendant's residence in Washington
-. 009 A-21 Defendant was suffering from current emotional
problems
-7.008 C-10 Defendant's motive was hardship
-. 002 A-11 Defendant's job classification was professional or
managerial
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